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The New Rules of an Oil Shock

By Sahasra Nangineni, edited by Anandini Agrawal · · 9 min read


A year ago this week, Washington sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil companies. Last month, President Trump signed a law threatening tariffs of up to 500 per cent on Russian goods. This month, he waived it, and a tanker of Russian diesel is now sailing for New York. Enemies-to-lovers might be overstating it, but whatever this is, it ticks every box of a relationship neither side wants to define.

Nobody has made it official: the existing sanctions are, technically, still in place. Each side is getting exactly what it needs: Washington gets diesel before the midterms, and Moscow gets paying customers and a little sanctions relief. Russia had spent the summer not answering anyone’s calls, banning its own diesel exports after Ukrainian drones hit its refineries, and has suddenly started replying. The friends disapprove: Zelenskyy has called it an investment in war. And, as these things tend to, it comes with an expiry date: the Treasury licence runs out in April. With Brent near $117 and diesel above $6 a gallon a week before the midterms, apparently principles have a price ceiling too.

Crude isn't the problem

Trump has said Russia has agreed to supply 300,000 metric tons of diesel (roughly 2.25 million barrels) into the US and global markets, with potentially larger shipments to follow. The US Treasury has issued a temporary licence for the transaction, and an executive order has suspended large parts of the sanctions against Russia, allowing the deal to proceed without invoking secondary tariffs or other penalties through the Graham Act. If the first cargo arrives as planned, it will be the first Russian diesel shipped to the United States since July 2023, according to the ship-tracking firm Kpler. Diesel prices have been squeezing trucking, agriculture and construction, which are not particularly convenient industries to have struggling just weeks before the midterm elections.The administration presumably has little obvious interest in explaining to voters why filling up their vehicles has become more expensive while trying to maintain its geopolitical principles.

The current oil shock also differs from the crude-supply collapses of the 1970s. The war with Iran, which began with US and Israeli strikes on 28 February, has choked shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which before the conflict carried about a fifth of the world’s refined petroleum trade.

Diesel has been hit harder than crude. The September export figures (down 700,000 barrels a day, with Russia and the Middle East down 1.3 million). China’s suspension of October fuel exports. Crude can be rerouted or released from reserves, but diesel has to be refined first, and refining capacity is itself damaged.

Line chart of Brent crude and US diesel prices in 2026, indexed to January = 100. Brent jumps to about 176 in April, falls to about 126 in July and rises to about 171 in September. Diesel rises to about 156 in April, dips to about 141 in July and reaches about 179 in September, slightly above Brent.
Source: US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (1) and (2). Prices indexed to January 2026 = 100.

Note that diesel's cumulative price increase is slightly larger than Brent's. Since diesel powers freight and agricultural machinery, higher prices feed into the cost of transporting goods and getting food to consumers. It is rather difficult to avoid paying for more expensive transport when almost everything you consume has had to be moved somewhere first.The International Energy Agency now expects global oil demand to fall by 2.6 million barrels a day this year, with diesel accounting for about a quarter of the drop. Economists call this demand destruction, which is a polite way of saying people are using less because they can no longer afford it.

Unfortunately, a farmer cannot simply stop using diesel and wait for the market to correct itself, which is presumably why the government has decided to intervene rather than deliver a lecture on supply and demand.

There is also a stranger question: why does the world’s largest oil producer need to import diesel at all? The United States is a net exporter of petroleum, but the shortage is concentrated in the north-east, particularly New York Harbor. Trump has also chosen to enact the Jones Act Waiver, allowing foreign-owned ships to transport goods between domestic US ports as opposed to requiring only US-owned, built and crewed ships - even though this is predicted to reduce gasoline prices by only pennies per gallon.

Resilient, on average

The global economy is better equipped to absorb oil shocks than it was in the 1970s, with oil intensity of GDP (how much the GDP is affected by oil prices) having fallen sharply : in 1973 the world used about 958 barrels of oil for every $1 million of GDP, compared with about 377 barrels in 2025, a fall of roughly 61 per cent. Cars have become more fuel-efficient, power generation has moved away from oil, and electric vehicles are starting to take over some transport, and growth has shifted towards services that need relatively little oil.

Line chart of barrels of oil used per 1 million dollars of global GDP, falling from 958 in 1973 to 377 in 2025, a decline of roughly 61 per cent.
Source: The Beiruter 2026

The shale revolution has also turned the United States into the world’s largest oil producer , pumping almost as much as Saudi Arabia and Russia combined. Economic growth is therefore less dependent on oil than it once was, although this does not mean that everyone has suddenly become immune to expensive fuel.

Research suggests that oil shocks now have a milder macroeconomic impact than they did in earlier decades. In March, the Yale Budget Lab estimated that a $25-per-barrel increase, sustained for a quarter, would lead to a roughly 0.3 per cent fall in US real GDP after a year, alongside a 0.3 per cent rise in core prices. That estimate was made when the shock was a month old. Brent is roughly $45 above pre-war. Yale’s own warning about duration and scaling. These effects are still meaningful, and oil-importing economies in Europe and Japan, alongside emerging markets with thinner fiscal cushions, remain particularly vulnerable to prolonged price increases. India, which now buys close to half its crude from Russia, is one of them. The global economy may have become more resilient, but averages have a rather irritating habit of concealing who is actually absorbing the losses. In the United States, the gains to oil producers now largely offset the losses to everyone else, which is cold comfort to a trucker.

Yet the Russia diesel episode shows that a smaller dependence on oil is still a dependence. Higher prices are supposed to reduce demand and encourage production, but unfortunately, neither happens as instantaneously as Trump deciding to sign an executive order. Waiting for the market to adjust can be costly for businesses and consumers (who, unfortunately, cannot pay their bills in economic theory). In the short run, therefore, governments have an incentive to intervene, particularly when the pressure falls on politically sensitive industries just before an election.

Two hours of diesel

For all its political significance, the initial shipment is small. The first tanker carries about 40,000 tonnes, or roughly 300,000 barrels, enough to cover a couple of hours of American consumption. Even Trump’s headline figure of 300,000 tonnes works out to about 73,000 barrels a day over a month, which a Kpler analyst said would probably not move global prices much. A few additional cargoes cannot resolve the underlying supply constraints or guarantee that disruptions will ease in 2027, a recovery the IEA itself describes as fragile.What matters more is how long prices remain elevated, as higher energy costs will continuously domino to make both production and cost of goods for consumers far more expensive. Potential inflationary pressures persisting alongside output decreases is likely to create the kind of stagflationary pressure policymakers would probably rather not have to explain to voters. The Federal Reserve meets on 28 October with oil above $116, and neither of its options is attractive: raising rates deepens the slowdown, while holding them risks letting inflation expectations drift upwards. If Blanchard and Galí are right that credible central banks made earlier shocks milder, this is where that credibility gets tested.

There are also geopolitical costs. Easing restrictions on Russian petroleum exports gives Moscow another outlet for its products at a time when Ukraine and several European governments would prefer to constrain Russian revenues. Last year, India was hit with a tariff hike from 25% to 50% due to buying Russian oil. The Graham Act has, however, effectively bailed out India earlier subjected to a 100% tariff as one of the five largest buyers of Russian oil and gas. This year, however, Europe has had a less comfortable month. Washington warned Germany and France to release their emergency diesel stocks or face a US export ban, and once the G7 agreed, Trump said the ban had never really been on the tableMore broadly, it raises the question of how credible energy sanctions can be when the countries imposing them are themselves exposed to the costs of restricting supply.

Russian diesel may ease some pressure in the American market, but it cannot resolve the conflict affecting the Strait of Hormuz or eliminate the geopolitical risk premium keeping prices elevated. In December, Reuters argued that oil’s geopolitical premium had vanished in 2025 and might not return. Ten months later, it is back with interest.The deal is less a solution than a way of buying time, which is a fairly common approach to difficult problems, although perhaps a less reassuring one when buying time involves relaxing sanctions on a country the same government has spent years trying to isolate economically.

Officially, nothing has changed

The US-Russia diesel deal shows how an economy can become less dependent on oil without becoming independent of its supply. Greater efficiency and domestic production have reduced the damage caused by price increases, but shortages can still force governments to reconsider policies they previously treated as non-negotiable. Managing an oil shock therefore involves deciding how much economic pain can be tolerated before the political costs become too high, which is a rather different calculation from simply waiting for markets to find their equilibrium. High prices may eventually accelerate the transition towards more efficient energy use and electric transport, as they did after the 1970s, when oil demand in Europe, Britain and Japan never returned to its 1979 level. But these changes cannot happen quickly enough to help the people paying more for fuel today. For now, Washington and Moscow have found themselves in a relationship neither will put a name to. Officially, nothing has changed: the sanctions are still on the books, and nobody has been introduced to the parents. In practice, Washington has waived them twice in as many weeks, and the whole affair comes with a pre-agreed end date, signed by the Treasury, for April. Even the grand gesture is suspiciously timed: the first tanker docks on 7 November, four days after the midterms it was meant to impress. Moscow would be wise not to read too much into any of it. Washington’s devotion, like its demand for diesel, is inelastic only in the short run.

References

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